The federal government has been the most important source of funds for academic research since the 1950s. Nearly a third of this support takes the form of indirect cost recovery (overhead). Long a source of conflict between universities and the government, in recent years the indirect cost controversy has escalated, with most research universities intensively investigated for alleged abuses. This essay examines the nature of indirect costs and the sources of the conflicts about them. The main argument is that the types of costs that are covered by overhead charges must be paid for the research intensity of universities to be retained; however, the existing system for reimbursing these costs creates unnecessary distortions in the operation of universities and has very high transactions costs. Instead, both universities and the federal government would be better off if the existing indirect cost reimbursement system were replaced by a system of fixed reimbursement rates that were not related to a university's actual indirect costs.
chapter, we have concluded that the source of the friction between universities and the government is the method that the federal government uses for paying for university research, not the intentions or integrity of either party. In particular, the methods used by the government to pay for indirect costs distort the incentives of both universities and federal agencies, and lead to wasteful expenditures by both. To solve this problem requires fundamentally changing the form of federal research grants to universities.
The federal government pays for university research grants through 1 cost-based contracts that are similar to the procedures that are used to pay defense contractors for weapons system development. The amount awarded is based on projected costs, and the university can keep only that portion of the award for which it can document that these costs were incurred. Thus, federal research grants are essentially contracts under which the university promises to undertake a project and to monitor the expenses incurred in doing so, and the federal government agrees to pay the estimated cost of the project when work is initiated and to let the university keep the appropriately documented expenses of the project. This method of funding is often called, inaccurately, -2-"full cost reimbursement" because, in principle, it is based on the idea that the government pays for all of the cost of research it supports. 2 To support cost-based contracting, the federal government requires universities to establish elaborate government-approved and government-audited accounting systems for calculating the cost of research projects for the purpose of determining federal reimbursement.
The incentive for principal investigators and universities to perform high quality research is generated by the process of competitive awards that are based on peer review. Simply put, the prospect of being awarded future grants and obtaining other reputational benefits are the sources of the incentive to perform high quality research.
On average, approximately seventy percent of a federal research grant Thus far, the main response to the indirect cost controversy has been for government and universities to devote increasing resources to calculating and auditing overhead costs. This process itself is a major cause of the increase in overhead expenses because running and administering the accounting system is itself treated as an overhead cost! More fundamentally, in times of declining federal budgets, some have questioned whether government ought to be paying any overhead expenses at all. The rationale for this position is that the government has no obligation to pay indirect costs because the university would have to incur most of these expenditures even if no federal research were performed.
We believe that the fundamental cause of controversies regarding indirect cost recovery is neither inadequate effort in implementing accounting and auditing systems, nor mismanagement on the part of either universities or granting agencies. Instead, the fundamental problem is the very concept of using a system of retrospective cost reimbursement to calculate indirect cost rates. In particular, we propose that federal grants pay for university overhead cost through a prospective standards-based reimbursement system in which overhead rates for all universities are determined through periodic audits of a small sample of similar universities. In particular, a university's reimbursement for indirect costs would not depend on its own accounting estimates of its overhead costs. A prospective reimbursement system of this sort would sharpen the incentive to manage overhead costs efficiently, remove a number of other distortions that are created by the current cost-based system, and drastically lower the cost of accounting for and administering federal grants, while still providing adequate support for -4-high quality research.
Our proposal is similar in spirit to regulatory reforms that are currently sweeping through a wide variety of regulated industries and to the changes underway in paying for health services. The idea is that when many firms are producing similar products, one can base reimbursement for any particular firm on the average cost of all of the firms. This severs the link between a firm's costs and its reimbursement, and thus creates incentives for individual firms to manage their costs efficiently. This idea motivated the prospective payment DRG system for Medicare payments to hospitals, and has been applied by state and federal regulators in electricity, transportation, and telecommunications.
This essay proceeds as follows. The next section describes the contracting problem that the government faces in supporting university research. Next, we describe the general approach that the government has taken to solve this problem through its cost-based reimbursement system. We then explain why this system works so poorly when applied to overhead costs, and why prospective reimbursement would work much better.
THE NATURE OF THE R&D CONTRACTING PROBLEM
A university can be viewed as a firm producing several outputs, including education and research. Neither of these outputs can be measured very accurately. Educational output is measured by years of study, scores on tests, and numbers of various degrees, but these measures do not capture educational quality. Research is even more complex. New ideas can not be measured or weighed. Furthermore, in addition to new ideas, an output of research is improved capabilities and competencies in the faculty and students performing the research. Thus, providing objectively verifiable measures of a university's educational output is difficult, and objectively measuring a university's research output is essentially impossible.
-5-
The key consequence of the difficulty of measuring output is that the federal government and universities can not write research contracts that are based on measured output. This point is extremely significant. When the output of the activity can be adequately measured in some objectively verifiable fashion, the contracting problem is easy to solve. Firms can offer proposals describing the output that they will produce and the price that they will charge. Government can select the offer that provides best value. A simple competitive bidding process for a well-defined product creates no need for retrospective cost-based contracting.
The problem with R&D procurement is that the parties can not base their contract on outputs. About the only aspect of a research program that can be measured objectively is the university's expenditures on inputs. Therefore, not surprisingly, R&D contracts are essentially contracts over inputs instead of outputs. That is, in a research contract, a university promises to make certain types of expenditures and the federal government makes payments on the basis of cost estimates that are secured by an offer of proof that the university did spend the funds in the way that was promised. The purpose of the accounting system that the government requires is to provide objectively verifiable measures of these expenditures.
Two features of this process are worth noting.
First, by contractually specifying what sorts of expenditures the university will make, the federal government gains a fair measure of control over the nature and type of research that will be done. Clearly, a principal investigator can not spend funds for performing experiments on a particle accelerator to study yak breeding in Nepal without running a serious danger of being detected. Therefore, contracting over inputs provides the government with some contractual control over the variable that it is truly concerned about, which is the output of research. Consequently, cost-based reimbursement is a natural and logical approach to R&D contracting.
Second, a contract over expenditures provides no direct incentive for a -6-principal investigator or a university to conduct high quality research. In the present system, the incentives for high quality research operate primarily through the reputation-building effects of high quality research. To the individual investigator, reputation is acquired by establishing priority in findings, and thereby having one's name associated with new ideas, which in turn facilitates obtaining more financial support for research that will finance producing still more results and gaining even greater reputation. 6 Similarly, high quality research is useful to a university in attracting students, gifts from private donors, and future federal grants.
The importance of the reputational value of good research is enhanced by using competition and peer review to award federal grants. A major factor affecting peer judgement is the principal investigator's performance on previous projects and the university's reputation for providing a supportive and productive research environment. This reputational mechanism neatly finesses the problem of objectively measuring research outputs. It may not be possible to base legally enforceable contracts for a particular project on experts' informal evaluations of the worth of the research, but it is possible to base next period's award on these judgements.
For this reputational mechanism to provide a significant incentive to universities, the university must regard obtaining future grants as important.
That is, some sort of prize must be attached to the award of a research grant, and a larger prize will create a greater incentive to provide an environment which nurtures and supports high quality research.
Overhead Costs in Contractual Relationships
Recall that approximately thirty percent of the costs incurred by universities are indirect or overhead costs, and that most indirect costs are central administration and the depreciation, operation and maintenance of buildings and equipment. The distinction between indirect and direct costs is -7-closely related to the concept of incremental or marginal cost, which is the additional cost of undertaking an activity, given that all of the other activities of the organization still will be undertaken.
Overhead costs have two defining characteristics: invariance and opacity.
First, for the most part indirect costs are not incremental or marginal with respect to any single activity of the university. That is, a particular research project were cancelled, total overhead expenditures would be almost completely unaffected. Indeed, even if the university scaled back its research efforts substantially, it would still need to incur a large part of its overhead expenditures to operate its educational activities. Similarly, if the university scaled back its education efforts, much of the overhead costs would still be needed to support its research activities.
Second, even if an indirect cost element is partially incremental with respect to a particular activity, the precise extent to which it is incremental is almost impossible to measure in a way that could be implemented through an accounting system. Accounting systems are not able to conduct the thought experiment of estimating the long-run effect of a change in university activities on overhead costs.
Because federal research grants are essentially cost-based contracts, one issue that arises is whether and to what extent federal research grants ought to pay for overhead expenditures. To the extent that indirect costs are not incremental for any particular activity, the university would still incur them to accomplish its remaining activities, even if the federal government supported no research at the university. However, if these costs are not paid by someone, the university will be unable to accomplish any of its activities because it will become financially unviable. The fact that indirect costs are not incremental does not make them any less real, and paying them any less necessary to the institutional survival of the university.
A second issue pertaining to indirect cost recovery concerns monitoring -8-and reviewing these costs to determine if they are "reasonable." For direct costs this function is largely performed in the process of reviewing proposals. In a proposal the principal investigator lists in some detail the direct costs that will be incurred by a research project. Before the proposal is submitted university administrators check these costs to assure that specific cost items (including indirect costs) are accurate and that the proposal does not commit the university to perform a project that will cost far more than the amount of funds requested. Upon submission the awarding agency makes a broad assessment as to whether the proposed costs seems appropriate and necessary. Because indirect costs are not directly associated with any particular research project, the granting agency can not make such a determination with respect to overhead costs. We argue below that the best policy response to this problem is to create incentives for universities to manage overhead costs themselves, rather than to devote substantial resources to measuring whether the costs that are incurred are necessary and reasonable.
Government and University Objectives
To design an effective contracting mechanism between universities and the federal agencies that support research, one must first understand the objectives of each party in contracting for research. In this case, specifying with precision the goals of both parties is quite difficult. Both government agencies and universities are nonprofit institutions, so that their objectives can not be reduced to simple measures of financial performance, as is the case for businesses. Whereas the goals of nonprofit institutions are not thoroughly understood, Chapter One suggests some plausible motivations:
(1) growing as large as possible; (2) accomplishing certain social goals that managers view as desirable; and (3) maximizing managerial status, recognition, perquisites, and benefits. Because universities are managed in large measure by senior faculty, the latter goals can be interpretted as -9-serving social objectives that are widely shared among faculty and maximizing the status and welfare of faculty.
To obtain the funds necessary to achieve these objectives, both agencies and universities must satisfy certain external constituencies. Consequently, to attain their core objectives, nonprofit organizations must orient their behavior to serve these groups. Because both government agencies and universities serve numerous constituencies, they can be regarded as pursuing complex, multidimensional objectives that are partially, but not completely, overlapping. Differences in objectives are at the heart of the controversies about federal grants to universities, and create the contracting problem that must be overcome to make federally sponsored university research as efficient as possible.
Federal grant programs for sponsoring university research presumably serve three purposes: (1) to achieve the specific research objectives that are promised in a successful proposal; (2) to accomplish more general objectives concerning the strength and topical breadth of the research capabilities of the nation; and (3) to strengthen the educational system for students in technical disciplines. Whereas these objectives are to some extent complementary, they are also distinct enough to require separate attention if each is to be attained efficiently.
For the purposes of this chapter, the main implication of the multiplicity of government goals is that the federal government arguably has a fairly large interest in supporting university indirect costs because overhead supports other valued activities in addition to federally sponsored research projects. More generally, the federal government must explicitly identify and design into the grant system mechanisms to assure that the broader purposes of support for research universities are taken into account.
An important feature of the implementation of federal R&D policy through numerous sponsoring agencies is that in an agency that supports university research a balance among government's objectives is unlikely to arise. Each -10- The main conclusion that follows from the discussion of goals is simply that universities and the federal government do not have the same objectives.
In particular, the correct way to view the federal government's problem is that it is truly an incentive contracting problem in which the government must seek to design institutions and contracts that create incentives for universities to act more in the way the government prefers, and less in the way that universities would prefer if federal money came with no strings attached.
In ordinary market transactions with for-profit firms, the federal government creates incentives by allowing firms to earn a profit if desired results are achieved. The fact that defense contractors must earn a profit is a reality that must be taken into account in designing the defense contracting system. Analogously, in transactions with universities the federal 7 government must permit something like profits on activities that it wants to encourage, knowing full well that the university will then use these funds to -12-pay for activities that the federal government does not value so highly. This analog to profits provides the university with the incentive to undertake the activities that the government prefers. Therefore, for incentive-based reasons, the government usually will find it desirable to pay more than cost.
Economic actors that are always paid cost and nothing more have no incentive to spend efficiently or to produce results that the sponsor wants.
The second conclusion that follows from these observations is that the net cost to the federal government of allowing universities to earn a profit on sponsored research is much less than the gross amount of the profit for three reasons. First, some of the profit will be used to support activities that the federal government values but does not support directly. Second, the possibility for profit, if properly designed, will increase the incentive of the university to undertake its work more efficiently than would be the case under a cost-reimbursement contract. Third, the prospect for profit will give the entire university, not just the grant recipient, a stake in maintaining the quality of federally sponsored research, thereby increasing output per dollar of effort.
Alternatives to Contracting
Given the problems with contracting for R&D, the question that naturally arises is whether the federal government could better respond to these problems by avoiding contracting altogether and conducting more R&D in government research labs. Reflecting the problems of contracting for research, private companies typically undertake virtually all research in their own research divisions. In other nations a far larger fraction of 8 government-supported research is undertaken in government-operated laboratories, rather than companies or universities. Indeed, in many countries both universities and industries that undertake government-sponsored research are nationalized.
-13- incentives to do the work that is most valuable to managers rather than projects that are most appealing to researchers.
For some combination of these reasons, the federal government supports a relatively decentralized R&D program through contracting with universities.
For the purposes of this chapter, we simply take this decision as given. The relevant question, then, is how contracting methods might be improved.
THE MECHANICS OF COST-BASED REIMBURSEMENT
Because of the inherent difficulties in writing performance contracts for R&D, the federal government has chosen to use cost-reimbursement according The basic function of the cost accounting system is to define a set of final cost objectives, or products that the university can be viewed as producing, and then to assign every dollar of cost incurred by the university to one and only one of these cost objectives. Under such a system, the university's total costs equal the sum of its costs of producing individual products. The accounting systems used by universities recognize each federally supported research project as a separate cost objective or product.
-16- For example, the fraction of library costs that is allocated to federal grants is often determined by conducting surveys in which people who enter a library are asked whether they made that particular trip for the purpose of carrying out federally sponsored research. In similar fashion, the fraction of the cost of faculty office space and laboratories that is allocated to federal grants is typically determined by asking a faculty member, or whoever else is present when the surveyor arrives, what fraction of the total activity in the office or lab is devoted to federally sponsored research, as opposed to other research, teaching, or administration.
These questions presuppose that the time spent on federally sponsored research is clearly separable from the time spent on other activities. For example, the concept of a specific federally sponsored research project is frequently arbitrary, as all of the work directed by a faculty member may be closely related and supported by several sources. Likewise, the time a -18-faculty member spends explaining a research project to a student research assistant, or teaching the student how to use laboratory equipment, is both research and education. Our experience is that the responses to these surveys about the allocation of time and space to federally sponsored research vary widely because of different interpretations that people give to a question that asks them to make arbitrary allocations among joint activities.
Given the PCBA fractions that are determined as described above, overhead costs are allocated to federal research projects according to the following procedure. The PCBA fraction for a particular overhead pool is multiplied by the total costs in that pool. The costs that are so allocated from each pool are added to determine the total amount of overhead costs that are allocated to federal research grants. This total is allocated across federal grants in proportion to the direct costs (excluding equipment costs)
that are charged to each grant.
Note that grant awards are based on projected accounting costs. In order to project overhead costs on government grants, the university, in conjunction with the federal government, must estimate the university's total overhead costs and the direct costs that will be charged to federal grants.
The ratio of estimated total overhead costs for federal research to estimated direct costs of government grants, after some exclusions, is than calculated 13 to create a projected overhead rate. When submitting individual federal grants, the university multiplies the eligible direct costs by the projected overhead rate to determine a projected overhead cost for the contract.
An important characteristic of the reimbursement process for both direct and indirect costs is that while award amounts are based on projected accounting costs, the university is ultimately allowed to keep this money only if audited accounting costs are equal to or greater than the amounts awarded. 
THE EFFECTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
The cost-reimbursement approach to R&D grants begins with adapting tools that were invented for other purposes to the problem of establishing mutual obligations between contracting parties. Accounting was invented to assist firms in monitoring their own performance, and is nontrivial and interesting only because firms typically are sufficiently complex that managers are uncertain about precisely how their resources are used, and whether a particular use is profitable. Only then is a formal, costly method of systematically measuring the use of these resources is useful to managers.
The original and still primary purpose of accounting systems is to assist managers of an organization in carrying out their job effectively.
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Because an accounting system must incorporate fundamentally arbitrary methods of allocating the unallocatable and measuring the unmeasurable, it is an inherently imperfect mechanism to measure progress toward the goals of the 
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This section describes the main incentives that are created by the current system and argue that the general approach taken by the current system is a reasonable response to the nature of the government's contracting problem. Then, it will discuss some of the problems created by the current system. Before doing this, it will be useful to begin by first discussing the notion of incremental cost in greater detail.
Incremental Cost Some federal officials have proposed that universities
should receive, at most, the incremental cost of a research project to the university, and perhaps that even these costs should be shared. The incremental cost of an activity is the extra cost that is incurred by undertaking it, holding all other activities constant. The significance of incremental cost is that, by definition, the incremental cost of an activity is the minimum amount that an organization would have to be paid to be willing to do it if no funds were available from other sources. Two particular features of the concept of incremental cost and how it applies to research projects undertaken by universities are especially important: the relevant time horizon, and the confounding effect of synergies (or complementarities).
First, the incremental cost of a research project generally depends on the planning horizon being considered. In general, incremental cost is larger for longer time horizons. For a short planning horizon the university may have sunk resources in productive facilities that have no alternate uses, while for long planning horizons fewer of these decisions will have been made.
Thus, economists often speak of two notional time horizons: the short run, in which significant sunk expenditures have been incurred, and the long run, in which investments in all sunk expenditures must be replaced.
For research projects, we might think of the short run as lasting a few years, and the long run as lasting a decade or more. Thus, the short-run incremental cost of a research project would include costs for some equipment, materials and supplies not yet purchased, and some salaries.
However, some salaries would not be part of short-run incremental cost because the university would not fire personnel immediately if the loss of grant support was perceived to be temporary, or if long-term employment contracts (such as academic tenure) prevent it from doing so. Similarly, the university may have purchased certain equipment that would be used on the project, trained certain personnel, and built and recently refurbished the building that would house the project. Finally, the administrative superstructure may have been designed to support a certain anticipated level of grant activity, and might not be able to adjust its size instantaneously.
-24-To the extent that administrative costs can not vary with the level of grant activity, they would not be included in short-run incremental cost.
In the long run, most of costs become part of incremental costs to the extent that they would adjust to changes in the level of activity. If the loss of research grants was permanent, the university might not replace or renovate an obsolete building that houses research facilities, and might make long term adjustments in the size of its faculty and administration. Thus, some of these costs are incremental in the long run.
The second feature of incremental cost is that, for any organization pursuing multiple activities, the incremental cost of a group of activities considered as a whole is likely to be larger than the sum of the incremental cost of each activity, considered separately. The reason is that when productive synergies exist between activities (such synergies are called economies of scale or scope), these activities will have joint costs.
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These joint costs are not incremental with respect to any single activity, but nonetheless are incremental with respect to all joint activities considered together.
To illustrate this point and to show its significance, suppose that we calculate the incremental cost of each of a university's federally funded research projects. That is, for each project, we determine the costs that could be avoided if that project were not undertaken (but all other activities of the university, including all other federally funded research projects, were undertaken). Now add all of these costs together, and call it the sum of the incremental costs of federally funded research projects. Now perform the following calculation. View all of the university's federally funded research projects as a single activity and calculate the incremental cost of this activity. Call this the incremental cost of all federally funded research.
The latter number is virtually always larger than the former. That is, the sum of the incremental cost of all federally funded projects is less than the incremental costs of all federally sponsored research.
-25-
The reason for this difference is that federally sponsored research projects have synergies. A university can take advantage of the fact that it has multiple research projects to lower its costs of conducting each project.
For example, the university may use a piece of equipment on several projects.
If only one project were canceled, the university would still need to purchase the equipment to conduct the remaining projects. Thus, the cost of the equipment is not an incremental cost of any specific project. If the university canceled all projects, it would then no longer need to purchase the equipment. Thus, the equipment cost is incremental to all projects considered together. One can make similar arguments about buildings, graduate research assistants, libraries and university administration.
To guarantee that a university is paid enough to be willing to undertake federally sponsored research, the university must receive at least the longrun incremental cost of all federal research. If the government only pays short-run marginal cost, the university can maintain its research level for a few years, but it can not do so in the long run unless it finds additional funds to maintain the university's capital investments, research faculty, and administrative support system. Even paying long-run incremental cost for each project will be insufficient to maintain the ability of the university to undertake such projects, because the shared costs will not be reimbursed. The incremental cost of a single project may be low because many costs are joint with other federally sponsored activities; however, these joint costs must be paid by someone in order to enable a university to undertake federal research.
Just as it is folly to pretend that indirect costs do not have to be paid because they are not incremental with respect to any specific project, it is equally foolish to pretend that a particular project is a financial albatross if it does not pay as high an indirect cost rate as other projects.
From a financial standpoint, the university's financial status and the viability of its other activities are unaffected by the presence or absence of an activity for which the university is paid its long-run incremental cost.
-26-Consequently, a university is unambiguously better off financially if it accepts a grant that pays more than the long-run incremental cost of the new research that the grant supports, and that does not substitute for a grant that pays a higher indirect cost rate.
Moreover, if the university accepts a new grant that pays a lower indirect cost rate than is paid by the federal government, the federal government also benefits! The reason is that if a new research activity that is supported by a grant makes any contribution, however small, to pay for the fixed indirect costs of the university, the amount of overhead that will be charged to the government in the future will be less. Thus, whereas some claim that a project is being subsidized if it generates less indirect cost recovery than the federal rate, in reality all research sponsors are better off (and no project is subsidized) if every grant includes some payment in excess of the incremental cost of the project.
Desirable Features of the Current System
The general approach of the current system is a reasonable response to the nature of the government's contracting problem. It responds to the measurement problems of contracting for research, and, by overcompensating universities for federally sponsored research, it gives universities an incentive to become strong research institutions. The complete argument has four parts: (1) cost-based contracts make sense for direct costs but not indirect costs; (2) the accounting costs of federally sponsored research probably exceed the long-run incremental cost of this research; (3) payments in excess of long-run incremental costs serve a useful function for the federal government as well as benefit the university; and the present mark-up in grant awards over long-run incremental cost is a relatively inexpensive way to achieve these benefits.
(1) As discussed above, because output is intangible and uncertain, -27-government uses direct costs as the best available description of the research project that the university and government are agreeing will be undertaken.
Because direct costs do bear a close relationship to the nature of the research that is undertaken, they are not seriously misleading as an indicator of the product emanating from a research grant. Moreover, because direct costs are closely associated with the research that is undertaken, government program officers and peer reviewers can exercise at least some crude monitoring of the reasonableness of the expenditures, given the proposed research. Thus, with respect to direct costs, there seems to be no real alternative to cost-based contracting.
For indirect costs, the amount charged to a project bears no close relationship to the proposed research, and its reasonableness can not be monitored easily. Hence, cost-based contracting for indirect costs is substantially more of a problem than cost-based contracts for direct costs. Thus, a substantial portion of building depreciation, library costs, and administrative expenses are not incremental to federally sponsored research.
For private research universities these categories account for at least one third (frequently more) of all overhead costs, and about thirty percent of total grant awards is for recovery of indirect costs. Hence, private research universities receive a mark-up at least ten percent, and perhaps more, over the total incremental costs of federal research.
(3) Retaining a mark-up over incremental costs performs a desirable and necessary function. A mark-up on numerous grants creates a prize that rewards a university for maintaining a strong research environment. As we have argued, it is naive to think that universities are somehow automatically programmed to want to produce high-quality scientific research. The prospect of a large prize that can be used to support other university activities creates a substantial incentive to undertake high-quality research. Many faculty, students and administrators have no direct interest in the science and engineering fields that account for virtually all federal support for university research. In the absence of a broader university stake in federal grants, these members of the university community have no reason to nurture these fields. The mark-up on grants gives the entire community an incentive to keep its scientists and engineers competitive for future research grants.
-29-(4) Seemingly the more difficult part of the argument is to explain why paying a mark-up of ten percent does not cost the federal government very much. One reason that the mark-up is not very expensive is that the federal government probably values the other outputs of the university (and so wants to retain the quality and scope of university activities). Consequently, the mark-up is simply an indirect form of procurement. Undoubtedly some of the mark-up goes to pay for projects that the university values highly but that the federal government does not; however, a university's preferences are not likely to be completely in conflict with those of the federal government.
Thus, the research, education, and health care arising from the mark-up are also of some value to the federal government, which reduces the net effective cost of the mark-up to government.
In addition, if the federal government did not include some payment for the non-incremental indirect costs of the university in the overhead rate on grants, it eventually would have to find another way to pay for them if it wanted research universities to survive at their present quality and quantity of research. Although some indirect costs may not be incremental with respect to any single activity, they somehow must be paid. If no one pays for them, and if universities are not leaving significant opportunities for revenue unexploited, then the university must generate the funds to pay these costs by eliminating or reducing the quality of other activities. Thus, some of the mark-up on federal research grants simply goes to support overhead costs that the government would have to find some other way to pay for if it did not pay mark-ups on federal research grants.
Problems in the Present System
The main undesirable feature of the current cost reimbursement system is that it adds to the total cost of federally sponsored research in at least three ways. First, implementing the system is expensive, but the benefits of dealing separately with each -30-university are small. Second, the system actually discourages efficient management. Third, the system distorts the incentives of university managers in ways that make universities less effective in serving both federal objectives and their own goals. We explore each of these issues separately.
The System is Unnecessarily Costly. Maintaining the system of accounts and audits to implement cost reimbursement is itself a costly procedure, but the product of this process is indirect cost recovery rates that are broadly similar across categories of universities. Table 1 contains the indirect cost rates at about 70 universities. Because the sample is based on the universities that are most successful in obtaining grants from NIH, a few otherwise strong institutions that have no medical school and are not leaders in biology (e.g., Princeton) are excluded, whereas a few state universities that are not research universities but have a strong medical school are included.
As is apparent from Table 1 -33-universities spend substantial sums on the administrative apparatus that supports accounting and auditing indirect costs. We do not know precisely how much administrative cost is associated with estimating indirect costs. What is know is that indirect costs account for about 30 percent (about $3 billion) of sponsored research payments from the federal government, and that about twenty percent of indirect costs, running to more than a half-billion dollars, is accounted for by the administrative categories that include accounting, auditing, and monitoring grants. Our experience at our own universities is The System Does Not Reward Efficiency. Cost reimbursement contracting provides little direct incentive for universities to manage indirect costs efficiently. Of course, an indirect incentive to manage costs efficiently is created by the fact that universities compete for grants, and the cost of performing the research is one factor that sponsoring agencies consider.
Furthermore, at least for direct costs, agencies and peer review panels attempt to make some broad determination of whether costs are reasonable.
However, these factors do not provide as strong an incentives to minimize indirect costs because program officers and peer reviewers have no way of knowing whether indirect costs are reasonable, and no means of controlling these costs even if they believe the rates are too high. Moreover, negotiations over rates and auditing systems do not focus on whether expenditures were efficient --just on whether they were made for the purpose alleged.
The System Distorts University Management. The particular practice of basing overhead reimbursement on a university's own accounting estimates of -34-overhead costs creates serious and systematic incentives for universities to distort the way they conduct their activities in order to maximize the amount of overhead that is allocated to government contracts, and, thus, that government grants will pay for. Some examples are as follows.
Suppose that one type of research requires facilities that are more expensive than classrooms, while another type of research requires only the least expensive type of facility. In this case, the university can maximize indirect cost recovery by bundling low-cost research with classrooms and separating high-cost research from educational spaces, even if this arrangement is inefficient. The high-cost research facilities then will be fully reimbursed, while the reimbursement for low-cost research facilities will be a weighted average of the true costs and the (higher) cost of classrooms. Typically, research labs do have higher construction, maintenance and operating costs than most other space, so indirect cost accounting creates an incentive for universities physically to separate high-cost facilities with a substantial volume of federally sponsored research. This practice reduces the efficiency of university operations by inhibiting collaborative interaction across these physical boundaries and creating unnatural barriers between research and other activities, notably education, health care, and other community service activities. For example, indirect cost recovery procedures provide a disincentive for universities to make educational uses of research facilities that are used for federally sponsored projects, and to allow students to work in labs for academic credit rather than as research assistants.
Another example of a socially destructive distortion is the incentive that indirect cost recovery creates for the university to wall itself off from its surrounding community. Consider the case of a research library. Research universities subscribe to a long list of arcane, and very expensive, technical journals. If a university adopts the socially desirable policy of allowing members of the surrounding community to use its library, the indirect cost -35-audit will measure that a lower fraction of use is accounted for by sponsored research, and so cut the fraction of library costs that can be recovered as part of overhead. Quite rationally, the university is likely to make its research library off-limits to outsiders in order to increase its total grant payments from the government.
THE CASE FOR PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT
The main lesson from the preceding section is that indirect cost recovery for federal research grants is a procedure that allows universities to set a mark-up over the incremental costs of federal research. This mark-up rewards universities for committing resources to areas of research that have high federal priority and for creating an environment that supports and fosters high-quality research. Furthermore, as long as the purposes of federal support for university research extend beyond simply supporting the particular projects that receive awards, providing some excess of revenues over incremental costs is necessary.
Given this understanding of the economic role of overhead reimbursement, the current method of establishing mark-ups is seriously flawed. The goal in choosing a mark-up is to cover all incremental costs and provide an incentive for universities to want to win these awards in order to pay for other activities that universities value and, for the most part, policy-makers want as well. Perhaps a mark-up roughly equal to a university's own overhead rate provides roughly the correct incentive, but no theory predicts that current rates, or any others, are somehow precisely correct. In any case, variation in the magnitude of the mark-up across similar universities appears to have no justification in either economic analysis or public policy. Because overhead rates do not vary dramatically within broad classes of universities (e.g., public vs. private, and rank in the quality of education and research), essentially the same incentive could be created by using prospective benchmark -36-standards for overhead rates.
The concept of an indirect cost benchmark is to apply to each type of university the same fixed mark-up rate for overhead costs, based on a thorough government audit of overhead at a sample of peer universities. Benchmarks would be established by undertaking intensive, government-financed audits of a few universities. Universities would no longer be required to retain existing accounting systems for allocating indirect cost pools, to justify the amount recovered, and to undertake regular audits to authenticate that their indirect cost recovery was justified. Instead, universities would be required simply to maintain sufficiently transparent records that they could support a federal audit should they be selected as one of universities that would be audited to establish the next benchmark rate. The indirect cost rates derived from these audits would be fixed for several years, requiring the government to conduct only a few infrequent audits and giving universities a stable rate on which to report found that the aggregate rate for all administrative costs exhibited little variation among universities, so that adopting one rate for all would cause little disruption. The report also recommended "threshold" rates for libraries and student services that a university could adopt without providing proof by audit that actual expenditures matched or exceeded the flat rate.
The Pings recommendations remain a far better approach than the current system, and an excellent first step towards eliminating the present system.
Certainly a transition period when universities could retain some of the present system would ease the adjustment for schools with unusually high rates for their peer group, although, as explained above, the magnitude of the required adjustment is a small fraction of total revenues for even the outliers. In any case, the government's response to the Pings report --to cap administrative costs but to retain the auditing requirements and the rate negotiation process --ignores the single most important feature of the proposal: fixing a benchmark rate that is not likely to be affected by the cost experience of a single university, and so encouraging efficient administration.
Our proposal goes beyond the Pings report to recommend a flat rate for the indirect costs of buildings and equipment within each peer group of universities. Universities have steadfastly opposed this approach on the basis of the argument that, unlike administrative costs, building and equipment costs legitimately can differ substantially among universities -39-within the same peer group due to differences in the relative amounts of different types of research that each university undertakes. In theory, this observation is correct, but it is not conclusive.
As a practical matter, except for single-purpose medical schools and universities in which only the medical school receives a significant amount of federal research support, research universities tend not to be highly specialized in particular areas of science or engineering. Except for the differences between public and private universities and among regions due to differences in utility and construction costs, the unexplained variance in this component of indirect costs apparently is relatively small. Moreover, 26 if some universities did respond to a ubiquitous flat rate by specializing in fields that require little capital investments, the government could develop a peer group of specialized institutions that had its own rate. Furthermore, if benchmarking were adopted, provisions for special exemptions to retain the old system either permanently or during a transition could be made available for the few hard cases. Thus, the existing variation among universities falls into the category of a moderately interesting problem that can be solved rather than an inequity that is so immense that it makes the proposal unattractive.
Perhaps a more likely reason for resistance to benchmarking for buildings and equipment is that, unlike administrative costs, universities do not want to face an incentive to control these expenditures. Recall that the fundamental problem in keeping these costs reasonable is knowing whether they are necessary and efficient. Universities probably do not serve the objectives of faculty or top management by having a larger staff than they need for accounting and auditing; however, these groups may enjoy gold-plated buildings. Moreover, excessive expenditures on buildings, but not on administration, typically are financed from new and separate university funds (donors, state construction budgets), enabling the university to collect twice for building costs (the second time through indirect cost recovery). By -40-contrast, because donors are unlikely to endow administrative costs, universities collect the administrative costs of federal grants only once.
Hence, universities have a much stronger incentive to reject benchmarking for facilities costs than for administrative costs.
A benchmark system for all components of indirect cost recovery has five important features that deserve a crisp summary.
First, the proposed system would continue to fulfill its main functions:
providing a prize to universities for winning research grants and paying for some of the nonincremental overhead costs that are necessary to support all university activities. Because overhead rates within broad categories of universities do not vary greatly, this objective could be accomplished without a sudden, massive redistribution of grant revenue.
Second, benchmarking indirect costs reduces accounting and auditing requirements, and so provides an opportunity for considerable cost savings.
Increasingly stringent accounting rules and intensive audits have caused a dramatic increase in administrative indirect costs. Part of administrative overhead is due to accounting, auditing, negotiating, and even litigating indirect costs.
Third, under a benchmarking system, universities would experience a new and potentially powerful incentive to eliminate excessive overhead expenditures. Under the current system, when a university incurs extra overhead expenditures for any allowable cost, it creates a basis for requesting a higher reimbursement rate from the federal government. Under a benchmark system, universities have an incentive to economize on indirect costs, thereby maximizing the difference between reimbursements and actual costs, which is the mark-up that can be spent on other priorities. Incentive prizes that are created by mark-ups are valuable because they encourage universities to incur overhead expenditures that increase the ability of the university to obtain research grants, but discourage spending on frills.
Fourth, the leverage that the federal government can exercise over -41-universities about how they spend indirect costs is minimal. The government has attempted to control some elements of indirect costs by capping them, by negotiating lower rates than are justified by the accounting procedures that the government requires, and by insisting that some funds from indirect cost recovery be spent in the same cost. But this interventionist approach is procedurally costly. Moreover, direct government oversight is not likely to have much of an effect on the propensity of a university to make extravagant and wasteful expenditures, not because universities are so adeptly managed, but because the government has no effective means for using indirect cost accounting to improve the quality of university management. Benchmarking replaces ineffective auditing procedures with much more effective direct incentives.
Fifth, the current system creates a serious and systematic set of incentives for universities to distort the way they conduct their research and other activities in order to maximize the amount of overhead that government will pay. All of these distortions would vanish under benchmarking.
CONCLUSIONS
The rationale for a system of cost-reimbursement for the direct costs of university research grants is easy to comprehend. Research projects are likely to vary enormously in cost, depending upon the number of personnel involved, the equipment that is needed, etc. One would be hard put to justify a method for reimbursing the direct costs of a research grant that did not explicitly deal with the differences in resources committed to, say, research projects in abstract mathematics versus high-energy physics. To induce universities to strike a proper balance between inexpensive and expensive projects (i.e., not to specialize in mathematics while closing down laboratory sciences), the size of a grant must reflect its direct costs. Insisting that a university must be able to prove that it actually spent the direct cost -42-award as promised is also prudent, given that the research output from a grant can not be objectively specified in advance or accurately measured after the project is completed.
Thus, a cost-reimbursement system for direct costs has considerable merit. It places restrictions on the uses of the grant by both the university and investigator, but it does not severely restrict the freedom with which the investigator manages the project, including selecting the specific research tasks to be carried out. Even though an elaborate accounting system for measuring direct costs may be costly to operate, it is likely to have significant advantages that would be difficult to match under any alternative.
A system of indirect cost reimbursement that is based on a university's own accounting costs is much more difficult to defend. Indirect cost recovery is best conceptualized as a procedure for allowing universities to set a markup over direct costs. This mark-up rewards universities for supporting and fostering high quality research in areas that the federal government wishes to support, reimburses universities for part of the overhead costs that support all of their activities, and gives them a little extra for supporting other activities that do not receive federal grants.
Because actual overhead rates do not vary a great deal within each broad class of universities, reimbursing overhead according to benchmark rates could accomplish the same desirable functions. Prospective reimbursement also would eliminate costly accounting and auditing requirements, provide universities with much greater incentives to manage their own overhead costs prudently, and remove a number of other distortions that are caused by retrospective costbased reimbursement of overhead. For all these reasons, we recommend that the federal government develop a system of grant awards for universities that makes far more extensive use of benchmarking.
-43-1. In addition to project grants, the federal government also supports university research through institutional grants, contracts with universities to manage national labs, and payments to university medical centers for health services that exceed their costs. This chapter focuses exclusively on research grants because they are an extremely important activity for research universities and because they raise quite different contracting problems than the other two forms of federal support. 24. The administrative cost cap has two benchmarks: a lower amount (24 percent) that requires less justification, and a higher amount (26 percent) that requires more extensive justification. The thrust of our argument is that once one has set a cap that is roughly equal to average cost under the present system, there is no reason to audit actual expenditures for the purposes of determining whether the university actually spent more than the capped amount.
-47- 26. The HHS Working Group, supra note 2, undertook a regression analysis of the components of indirect cost rates and found that nearly all of the variance among universities could be explained by ownership (private or public), amount of research expenditures (a measure of quality), and region (to reflect differences in wages, utility prices, and construction costs).
